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1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
The work of the main international standards committees involved in work 
on security for OSI (i.e. ISO, CCITT and ECMA) can be divided into three 
main parts.  First there is work on underlying techniques, such as:  
cryptographic algorithms, modes of operation for cryptographic algorithms 
and peer entity authentication mechanisms.  Second there is more general 
work describing how these techniques may be used to provide security in 
both OSI applications and various layers of the OSI model, such as: the 
OSI security architecture, Lower and Upper Layer security models and 
various security frameworks.  Third there is work on specifying how 
security should be provided in specific OSI applications, as typified by 
the security elements of the 1988 versions of the CCITT X.400 standards. 
 
In this paper we attempt to do two things.  We first survey the past and 
current efforts on security in OSI in all of the above three areas.  
Second, we consider in more detail one specific OSI application, namely 
CCITT X.400 store-and-forward messaging.  In particular we consider the 
security elements provided there, and explain how they might be used to 
provide secure messaging. 
 
2.  OSI SECURITY ACTIVITIES 
 
2.1  Security techniques 
 
Within ISO, work on techniques for security, in particular on 
cryptographic techniques, has been primarily focussed within ISO/IEC/JTC1 
SC20 (and will be continued by its proposed successor SC27).  Outside 
ISO, other work has proceeded within ANSI and the NBS (in the U.S.A.).  
We divide our consideration of this work into three areas:  algorithms 
(e.g. encryption functions, digital signature functions), peer entity 
authentication protocols and key management. 
 
2.1.1  Algorithms 
 
Encryption algorithms were the first type of algorithm to receive 
consideration by ISO.  This followed earlier work by ANSI in the U.S. 
resulting in the adoption of the Data Encryption Standard (DES) block 
cipher algorithm as a U.S. National Standard, [1], [15].  Considerable 
efforts were made in the early 1980s to get this same algorithm adopted 
as an international standard (to be called 'Data Encryption Algorithm 
1').  A draft international standard was prepared, ISO DIS 8227, [19], 
but this failed to obtain approval for adoption as an international 
standard.  Subsequently it was decided that ISO would not attempt to 
provide any standards for encryption algorithms (i.e. techniques for 
providing data confidentiality). 
 
Instead, it has been decided to adopt the idea of an international 
register of algorithms, through which any encryption algorithm can be 
given a standardised identifier.  The draft proposal ISO DP 9979, [31], 
caters for registering proprietary algorithms, the details of which may 
remain confidential to their owners. 
 
When the DES was adopted as a standard in the U.S.A., four 'modes of use' 
were also standardised, [2], [16].  These modes of use specify how the 
DES encipherment algorithm (a 64-bit block cipher) should be used.  This 
work was also taken up by ISO, resulting in an international standard, 
ISO 8372, [20], specifying modes of use for an arbitrary 64-bit block 
cipher algorithm.  A successor to this standard, in the form of a draft 
proposal, ISO DP 10116, [32], generalises this further to specifying 
modes of use for an N-bit block cipher algorithm.  The recent ANSI 
standard, X9.23, [6], details how the DES algorithm should be used to 
provide encryption of wholesale financial messages. 
 
In addition to data confidentiality, a good deal of work has also been 
done within ISO (and other standards bodies) concerning standardising 
algorithms for message authentication, integrity checking and digital 
signature.  The initial work on message authentication was undertaken by 
financial groups within ANSI, resulting in ANSI standards X9.9 and X9.19, 
[3], [5], which give standard methods for authenticating financial 
messages.  Parallel work, again specific to the financial application, 
has been carried out within ISO, resulting in ISO 8730 and ISO 8731 
(parts 1 and 2), [21], [22], [23].  For more general application, a draft 
international standard now exists, ISO DIS 9797, [28], for a data 
integrity mechanism. 
 
Finally, two standards proposals exist relating to digital signature 
algorithms.  The first is a draft proposal, ISO DP 10118, [34], 
specifying possible methods for computing hash functions for digital 
signatures; note that one of the methods described there will probably 
need to be removed in the light of recent work by Coppersmith, [12].  The 
second is a proposal for a signature algorithm for 'short' messages, ISO 
DP 9796, [27]. 
 
2.1.2  Peer entity authentication 
 
In parallel with the current work within ISO on algorithms, efforts have 
also been made to standardise the protocol exchanges involved in 
performing party-to-party authentication.  This has resulted in three 
draft proposals for standards, one covering the use of conventional 
(secret-key) cryptography, ISO DP 9798, [29], and the other two based on 
the use of public-key cryptography, ISO DPs 9799 and 10117, [30], [33].  
The exact form in which these documents should proceed towards standard 
status remains to be decided; currently there are moves to reduce the 
number of documents by producing a multi-part standard which would 
include DPs 9798, 9799 and 10117, as well as including a section on zero-
knowledge authentication protocols.  ANSI is also active in the area of 
authentication, and is preparing a standard, X9.26, [8], on access 
security for wholesale financial systems, which includes secure 
transmission of personal authenticating information and node 
authentication. 
 
2.1.3  Key management 
 
ISO work on this topic is at an early stage of development.  Three draft 
documents exist, entitled:  Cryptographic mechanisms for key management: 
Part 1: Key management overview, Part 2: Key management using secret key 
techniques and Part 3: Key management for public key register.  It is 
likely to be some time before any of these documents emerge as Draft 
Proposals, since at the moment none of them are any where near 
completion. 
 The general ISO work on key management will need to take account of 
earlier work in this area, in particular that undertaken for the 
financial community.  As with a number of other security standards, ANSI 
have led the way, with the production of ANSI standards X9.17 and X9.24, 
[4], [7], specifying how key management should be performed for certain 
kinds of financial application.  Like all ANSI standards, only management 
of symmetric keys using symmetric techniques is considered.  ISO has also 
been active in this area, with the production of a standard, ISO 8732, 
[24], again describing symmetric key management for financial 
applications. 
 
 
2.2  Using security mechanisms 
 
Within ISO, the questions of how and where within the OSI model security 
mechanisms are to be used falls primarily within the scope of SC21/WG1, 
together with the layer and application specific Working Groups of SC6 
and SC21.  We divide our discussion of this topic into three parts, 
covering:  security architectures and models, security frameworks and 
layer specific standards. 
 
2.2.1  Security architectures and models 
 
To date, the main achievement in this area has been the production of the 
OSI Security Architecture, ISO 7498-2, [18], in 1988.  This document 
covers a number of important topics, including: standardised definitions 
of security terminology and security services, a guide to the 
relationship between security services and mechanisms, an indication of 
which security services are relevant to which layers of the OSI model and 
a short introduction to security management. 
 
Subsequent to the production of this standard, work has started within 
SC21 and SC6 on two security models:  a Lower Layer Model (relevant to 
OSI Layers 1-4) and an Upper Layer Model (relevant to OSI Layers 5-7).  
These models are intended as general guides to the insertion of security 
facilities into the relevant layers of the OSI model.  Work on these two 
models is at an early stage and has not yet reached DP status. 
 
In parallel with these activities, security facilities are under 
consideration both within the ISO Open Distributed Processing group 
(SC21/WG7) and the CCITT's Distributed Applications Framework (DAF) 
activity.  Finally we briefly mention the ECMA work in this area.  ECMA 
have produced a technical report entitled Security in Open Systems - A 
Security Framework, [13] and have also produced a draft for an ECMA 
standard entitled Security in Open Systems: Data elements and service 
definitions, [14].  These documents are likely to be most significant in 
terms of the influence they have over subsequent ISO standards and CCITT 
Recommendations.  They have particular relevance to the provision of 
access control services in distributed systems. 
 
2.2.2  Security frameworks 
 
Another recently inaugurated work topic within ISO/IEC/JTC1 SC21 covers 
the 'security frameworks'.  This projected six-part standard will give a 
framework for the provision of particular security services in 
distributed systems.  The six parts will cover the following topics: 
Part 1: Authentication Framework 
Part 2: Access Control Framework, 
Part 3: Non-repudiation Framework 
Part 4: Integrity Framework 
Part 5: Confidentiality Framework 
Part 6: Audit Framework 
 
In addition there will be a Part 0, giving a general introduction to the 
six security frameworks.  All these documents are at an early stage of 
development, although it is hoped to progress Parts 1 and 2 to DP status 
within the next few months. 
 
2.2.3  Layer specific standards 
 
Apart from the Upper and Lower Layer Security Models, a number of other 
drafts are in existence covering the provision of security services in 
specific layers of the OSI model.  An ISO standard exists, ISO 9160, 
[25], specifying how security should be provided in Layer 1 (Physical).  
Within IEEE 802.10, work is progressing on standardising the provision of 
security in LANs, [17]; the proposed security functionality all resides 
in Layer 2 (Link).  In the U.S. SDNS activity, work is progressing on two 
documents, [36], [37], specifying how security should be provided in 
Layers 3 (Network) and 4 (Transport).  During the past few years 
ISO/IEC/JTC1 SC20/WG3 has also produced draft documents relating to the 
provision of security in Layers 3, 4 and 6 (Presentation), although the 
future of that work is not clear at the moment. 
 
 
2.3  Security for OSI applications 
 
We now very briefly consider the effort that has been devoted to 
providing standardised security solutions for specific OSI applications.  
Then in section 3 we consider in more detail the security provisions made 
for one particular OSI application, namely X.400 electronic mail. 
 
2.3.1  X.500 security 
 
The 1988 version of the X.500 CCITT Recommendations on Directory 
Services, [11], and their corresponding ISO draft standards, [26], 
include means to use the Directory Service to provide key management and 
peer-entity authentication through storage of user public keys in the 
directory.  The 1992 version of these recommendations is also expected to 
contain detailed provisions for access control to directory entries. 
 
2.3.2  X.400-1988 security 
 
The 1988 versions of the X.400 CCITT Recommendations, [10], include a 
variety of security features making it possible to provide a variety of 
security services for electronic mail.  We discuss these provisions in 
more detail in the next section. 
 
3.  SECURITY FOR X.400 STORE-AND-FORWARD MESSAGING 
 
3.1  Introduction 
 
We now consider in more detail security in electronic mail applications, 
with particular reference to the security features in the 1988 versions 
of the CCITT X.400 Recommendations, [10].  We devote the remainder of 
this introduction to a brief review of the fundamental concepts 
underlying the X.400 electronic mail system. 
 
The 1984 version of the X.400 recommendations, [9], define two basic 
types of entity in a 'store and forward' mail network, namely User Agents 
(UAs) and Message Transfer Agents (MTAs).  UAs originate and receive 
messages on behalf of users.  All messages are sent via one or more MTAs, 
which act as 'store and forward' message nodes.  The set of all MTAs 
collectively form what is known as the Message Transfer Service (MTS). 
 
X.400 is widely used as a generic term for a collection of related 
C.C.I.T.T. Recommendations, including X.400 itself, X.402, X.411, X.413 
and X.420, [10].  The protocols governing communication between pairs of 
MTAs and between a UA and the MTS are defined in X.411.  The protocol 
governing MTAÄMTA communications is often referred to as P1, and the 
UAÄMTA protocol as P3.  The entire collection of UAs and MTAs is referred 
to as the Message Handling System (MHS). 
 
In the 1988 version of the X.400 Recommendations, [10], in fact in X.413, 
a third type of entity is defined, namely a Message Store (MS).  Message 
Stores were not part of the 1984 version of X.400.  In some cases it is 
convenient to only connect a UA to the MTS at very infrequent intervals.  
However MTAs may only store mail for recipient UAs for a short period of 
time.  The role of a MS is to remedy this problem by acting as an 
intermediary between a UA and the MTS, with storage of received messages 
as its primary role.  UAs and MSs are in 1Ä1 correspondence, and an MS 
enables its corresponding UA to obtain summary information about received 
messages without actually retrieving them.  In practice, an MS is likely 
to be co-located either with an MTA or with its corresponding UA.  The 
Message Store Access Protocol, governing the retrieval of messages by a 
UA from its corresponding MS, is defined in Recommendation X.413.  Note 
that UAs and MSs are collectively referred to as MTS-users, in that they 
are both end-users of the Message Transfer Service. 
 
All the protocols so far discussed, namely those in X.411 and X.413, have 
the role of defining how an object called a message-content is shipped 
from one UA to another.  The form of this content is not constrained by 
X.411 or X.413, and may be one of a number of different types.  It is 
carried transparently by the MTS.  One such type is defined in X.420; 
this type is defined as suitable for use in Inter-Personal Messaging 
applications.  Other content types may be defined for different 
applications such as Electronic Data Interchange (EDI). 
 
Finally note that the set of parameters defined in X.411 and X.413, which 
accompany the message content when it is transferred from one MHS entity 
to another, are often referred to as the message envelope.  This is 
because in many ways these parameters have roles analogous to those of 
the addressing and franking information to be found on the  envelope of 
conventional paper mail.  However, in X.400 the form and content of the 
envelope depends on the type of entities which are involved in the 
transfer, e.g. submission envelopes are used to transfer from a UA to the 
MTS and delivery envelopes are used to transfer from the MTS to a UA. 
 
 
3.2  Security services 
 
Before describing electronic mail security services in detail, it is 
useful to consider what threats these services are intended to counter.  
Possible threats to electronic mail systems include:  masquerade, message 
replay/re-sequencing, modification of message information, denial of 
service, leakage of information and repudiation.  It is not possible to 
address all these threats from within a message handling application.  
For example information leakage will take place if it is possible to 
monitor the volumes of traffic going from one point in the network to 
another, even if all the message contents are encrypted.  To prevent this 
requires the provision of security services in the lower layers of the 
OSI stack, which is beyond the scope of application services. 
 
There are a considerable number of different security services that could 
be provided within an electronic mail system.  Such services may 
conveniently be divided into two classes, namely MTS-user to MTS-user 
services and MTS services (note that this is non-standard terminology). 
 
MTS-user to MTS-user services are those provided from one MTSÄuser (i.e. 
a UA or an MS) to another, without active participation by the MTS.  Such 
services include:  Message origin authentication, Proof of delivery, 
Content confidentiality, Content integrity, Message sequence integrity 
and Non-repudiation services. 
 
MTS security services are those provided which involve active 
participation by the MTS.  Such services include:  Secure access control 
to the MTS and between MTAs, Report origin authentication, Probe origin 
authentication, Proof of submission, Non-repudiation of submission and 
Message security labelling. 
 
The service names used here are those given in the X.400 Recommendations.  
These do not correspond precisely with the names used in ISO 7498-2, the 
OSI security architecture, [18].  This is partly because the OSI security 
architecture does not mention all the services relevant to electronic 
mail, and partly because the documents were developed in parallel. 
 
 
3.3  Approaches to providing security 
 
In order to provide security services for the message content it is 
normally necessary to transmit with the message a number of 'security 
parameters', e.g. encrypted keys and authentication checks.  These 
security parameters can either be transmitted in the message envelope or 
as part of a (specially formatted) message content, or both.  The choice 
of location for the security parameters not only has important system 
ramifications, but can also affect the type of security service which may 
be provided. 
 
If security services are required for X.400-1984, or other electronic 
mail systems without built in security features, then there is no 
alternative but to put the security parameters in the message content.  
The same is true for any heterogeneous mail systems, even if they 
individually incorporate security features.  Examples of electronic mail 
systems in which all the security parameters are in the message content 
are provided by the SDNS and IAB Internet mail security proposals.  
However, security parameters within the message content cannot be used to 
provide MTS security services. 
 
A distinct feature of the 1988 X.400 Recommendations is that the message 
envelope is used to transfer security parameters, and not the message 
content.  The inclusion of the security parameters in the message 
envelope enables the provision of MTS security services.  However, it 
does make the provision of certain MTS-user to MTS-user services rather 
problematical, especially if Message Stores are used. 
 
 
3.4  Security mechanisms 
 
Before we consider the security mechanisms described in the X.400 
Recommendations, we need to consider the provision of cryptographic key 
management, a fundamental requirement for the provision of communications 
security services.  Key management for the X.400 security facilities is 
achieved by use of the directory authentication service specified in 
C.C.I.T.T. Recommendation X.509, [11].  This key management system is 
based on the use of public key cryptosystems for digital signature and 
data encryption.  Recommendation X.509, [11], allows public keys to be 
stored in user directory entries. 
 
Since the directory service (and communications with it) may not be 
trusted, means need to be provided for users to verify public keys read 
from the directory.  This is provided for by the use of data structures 
called certificates, which we now briefly describe. 
 
In order to set up a key management system for X.400, every user who 
wants to use security services must first exchange public keys with an 
off-line entity called a Certification Authority (CA).  Each user must 
trust the CA which they appoint to act on their behalf.  The CA gives the 
user a copy of its public key (each CA has its own public key/secret key 
pair), and is given in return a copy of the user's public key (each user 
must also equip themselves with a key pair).  The CA then signs a copy of 
the user's public key, together with the user's name and the period of 
validity of the key, using the CA's secret key.  This forms a certificate 
and is actually what is put in the directory.  Any other user which has a 
trusted copy of this CA's public key can then check the validity of the 
certificate, and thereby obtain a verified copy of the user's public key. 
 
The scheme so far described does not cover the situation where two users 
are served by different CAs.  To cover this possibility, one CA may 
generate a certificate for another CA's public key; such certificates are 
called 'cross-certificates'.  If user A has CA X, and user B has CA Y, 
then if A is given a cross-certificate containing Y's public key signed 
by X, then A can obtain a verified copy of Y's public key.  Once it has 
this key, A can then check B's certificate.  Such cross-certificates can 
be made into chains called 'certification paths'. 
 
Virtually all the security services built into the X.400 Recommendations 
make use of a cryptographic construct called a token.  Tokens are always 
formed for a single recipient.  A token consists of a series of data 
fields with a digital signature appended, this signature being computed 
as a function of all the data fields in the token (using the originator's 
secret key).  These data fields include:  recipient-name, date/time of 
generation, a field called 'signed-data' and a field called 'encrypted-
data'.  The information within the encrypted-data field is enciphered 
using the public key of the intended recipient of the token (prior to 
computation of the signature). 
 
One form of token is called a message-token, and is used in the provision 
of all the MTS-user to MTS-user security services.  Hence, if a message 
requires such services, then a message-token is sent as one parameter 
within the message envelope.  The precise contents of the signed-data and 
encrypted-data fields within the message-token depend on which selection 
of security services is required.  However, whichever services are 
required, the presence of these data within the token prevents them from 
being changed and/or repudiated. 
 
In a message-token, the encrypted-data field may be used to contain any 
of the following items:  a cryptographic key (used to encrypt the message 
content if content confidentiality is required), a content integrity 
check (used in the provision of content integrity), a message security 
label, a content integrity key (used to compute the content integrity 
check) and a message sequence number (used in the provision of message 
sequence integrity).  The signed-data field may be used to contain any of 
the following items:  a content integrity check (used in the provision of 
content integrity), a message security label, a message sequence number 
(used in the provision of message sequence integrity) and a proof of 
delivery request. 
 
The proof of delivery and non-repudiation of delivery services are 
slightly different from other MTS-user to MTS-user services in that they 
are provided by the message recipient to the message originator.  If a 
message is received containing a proof of delivery request (in the 
signed-data field of the message token) then the recipient computes a 
signed version of the (unencrypted) message content together with other 
delivery related parameters.  This signature, computed using the 
recipient's secret key, is returned to the message originator within the 
delivery report.  The message originator then uses this signature to 
provide the required service(s). 
 
Means are also provided within X.411 and X.413 for a pair of MHS entities 
to perform peer-entity-authentication prior to opening a connection for 
the exchange of messages.  This protocol exchange again involves the use 
of tokens.  For systems providing Mandatory Access Control services, all 
messages and entities can be assigned security labels.  These labels can 
be tied to message contents by their inclusion in either the encrypted-
data or signed-data fields of the message token (depending on whether or 
not the label itself is confidential).  Inter-entity connections can also 
be assigned security-labels using the tokens exchanged in the peer-
entity-authentication process. 
 
 
3.5  Limitations of security in X.400-1988 
 
We conclude by very briefly mentioning three important limitations of the 
current X.400 Recommendations.  A more detailed discussion of these 
shortcomings can be found in [35]. 
 
First, proof of delivery to a UA is not available when an MS is used.  
Because of the way the protocols operate, the proof of delivery must be 
generated at the time the message is delivered by the MTS to the MTS-
user.  If this MTS-user is an MS, then it must generate and sign the 
delivery proof, and not the end user.  The message originator then has no 
proof that the message was ever delivered to the recipient UA, only to 
the MS belonging to the recipient UA. 
 
Second, proof of delivery by an MS is not possible if the message content 
is encrypted.  The proof of delivery must be computed using the 
unencrypted message content, which will not be available to the MS 
(unless the MS is equipped with the UA's secret key). 
 
Third, the specified form of token may allow the 'theft' of message 
content by third parties.  This arises because the signature on the token 
is computed after the secret data (in the encrypted-data field) is 
enciphered.  The problem would not arise if the order of these two 
operations was reversed. 
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